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Abstract
In this paper we study endogenous mergers in a model of strategic bar-
gaining. We allow for rm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize
the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger vary depending
on the identity of the participating rms. We make two main contribu-
tions. The rst is to show that relatively ine¢ cient mergers may take
place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence
of an alternative merger capable of generating larger synergies and hence
higher prots and higher social surplus. Our second contribution is a
methodological one. We use a bargaining model that is exible, in the
sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction
on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study endogenous mergers in a model of strategic bargaining.
We allow for rm asymmetries so that the identity of the merging partners
a¤ects the distribution of prots. In particular, we emphasize the fact that
potential synergies generated by a merger do vary depending on the identity of
the participating rms.
We make two main contributions. The rst is to show that relatively inef-
cient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize
despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating larger syner-
gies and hence higher prots and higher social surplus. Our second contribution
is a methodological one. We use a bargaining model that is exible, in the sense
that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the en-
dogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.
It is well known that for strategic reasons the occurrence of a merger does
not only depend on its relative protability with respect to the status quo.
Unprotable mergers may take place and, on the contrary, protable mergers
may be delayed. The rst outcome may occur when mergers are unprotable
(with respect to the status quo) but also attractive: rms prefer to be part of the
merger rather than competing with merged rivals. The literature refers to them
as preemptive mergers. The second outcome may take place when mergers are
protable but unattractive: rms prefer to stay out of the merger if one is going
to occur. In this case rms are engaged in a war of attrition. Such anomalies
are likely to have a positive e¤ect on consumer surplus. For instance, preemptive
mergers emerge when they generate su¢ ciently negative external e¤ects on rms
that do not participate in the merger. In this case mergers are likely to benet
consumers since the negative externality is probably associated to a substantial
reduction in the marginal cost of the merged rm, which more than compensates
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the increase in market concentration. Similarly, whenever mergers are protable
but unattractive (war of attrition) this is probably because the dominant e¤ect
is the increase in market concentration. In this case, if a merger is delayed then
this benets consumers.
These anomalies occur in our model as well. However, our model also pre-
dicts a di¤erent kind of anomaly that we can term as an identity failure: the
group of rms that agrees to merge need not be the one that maximizes neither
industry prots nor total surplus.
This new kind of anomaly is of a di¤erent nature of the ones already identied
in the literature. Indeed, the ones discussed in previous papers can be inter-
preted as instances of coordination failure. Equilibria where a protable merger
is delayed always coexist with other equilibria where the protable merger takes
place without delay. Similarly, equilibria where an unprotable merger takes
place always coexist with no-merger equilibria. Therefore, if players could co-
ordinate their expectations they would be willing to do so. In contrast, the
type of ine¢ ciency we have found would survive such coordination of expec-
tations. When mergers are protable and attractive then the equilibrium is
unique, and provided synergies generated by alternative mergers are not too
di¤erent, then an ine¢ cient mergers takes place with positive probability. Thus,
such ine¢ ciency is not caused by any coordination failure, but by a more generic
bargaining failure. Unless players are su¢ ciently heterogeneous, the relatively
ine¢ cient rm still enjoys a strong bargaining position, which interferes with
the implementation of the e¢ cient merger. Fixing this type of failure would
require a binding agreement with side payments among all relevant players.
Our paper is closely related to two di¤erent strands of the literature: on
endogenous mergers and on non-cooperative bargaining.
There is a large literature that endogenizes the set of mergers that will occur
in a market in the absence of merger control. Some authors have approached the
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problem using cooperative solution concepts for games in partition function form
(since a merger creates externalities on non-merging rms). See, for instance,
Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001). Other authors have set up non-
cooperative games where both the market structure and the division of surplus
are determined simultaneously. See, for instance, Kamien and Zang (1990), or
Gowrisankaran (1999). The two papers closest to ours are Inderst and Wey
(2004) and Fridol¤son and Stennek (2005). Our goal is similar to theirs, in the
sense that we also predict the market structure that results from a particular
non-cooperative bargaining game. However, these papers focus exclusively on
the symmetric case and hence the identity of the merging rms is not an issue
in their analysis. Moreover, there are important methodological di¤erences.
Inderst and Wey (2004) place symmetric rms in an asymmetric bargaining
position. In particular, nature chooses one of the rms as the target and the
rest place their bids in an auction where the target rm sets a reservation price.
Some of their specic results hinges precisely on the extra market power of the
target rm. In contrast, Fridol¤son and Stennek (2005) propose a bargaining
game that treats all rms symmetrically. However, the structure of the game
imposes certain restrictions on (probability distribution over) the set of feasible
mergers that tend to enhance the bargaining power of the weakest player. (We
will comment on this below.) As a consequence, their game generates multiple
equilibria in cases in which ours generates a unique one.
The merger problem we discuss in this paper is similar (and equivalent, for
some parameter values) to what has been termed the three-person/three-cake
problem (see, for instance, Binmore, 1985), or in general a (restricted) game of
coalition formation. Non cooperative analysis of this sort of problems abound.
Most of them use one version or another of a dynamic proponent-respondent
game in the Rubinstein-Stahl tradition. (See Ray, 2007, for a general discussion
including games with externalities, and Compte and Jehiel, 2010, for a recent
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example.) The particular timing and order of moves in such models di¤er and,
as a consequence, the outcomes of these games also di¤er. In fact, as Ray (2007,
page 140) puts it, a theory that purports to yield solutions that are independent
of proposer ordering is suspect. We agree with this assessment if the ordering
of proposers and movements, whether random or deterministic, is exogenous.
Our contribution in this line is to propose a game designed so that, in a precise
way that will be discussed below, this ordering of proposers is endogenous.
2 The model
2.1 Mergers and the distribution of prots
We consider an industry that is initially populated by three rms: 1; 2; 3: In
the absence of mergers, the equilibrium level of prots per period is given by 
T1 ; 
T
2 ; 
T
3

: We assume that competition authorities rule out a merger that
leads to full monopolization but are willing to consider mergers that lead to a
duopoly. In case rms (i; j) merge and rm k stands alone then equilibrium
prots per period are given by Dij and 
D
k ; respectively. Thus, in most of
the paper we will only be concerned with these nine numbers and not with
the fundamentals that determine these numbers through a particular form of
competition. Firms discount the future using the same discount factor  2 (0; 1).
Particular market structures and parameter values give rise to alternative
relationships between these numbers. In order to simplify the presentation we
focus attention on a representative case. First, if no merger takes place, then
all rms make the same level of prots, which we normalize to zero: Ti = 0:
Second, mergers between rms 1 and 3 or between rms 2 and 3 give rise to the
same prot distribution: the merged rm makes  and the rm that stands
alone makes . However, if rms 1 and 2merge then they make a level of prots
equal to  + ;   0; while the stand alone rm (rm 3) makes    ,
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0   < 12 . Thus, in the case  = 0 we are in the perfectly symmetric case. The
parameter  measures the degree of asymmetry across di¤erent mergers. Note
that if 1 and 2 merge, total prots, ( +)+ (   ), increase with . in
fact can be interpreted as the amount of extra synergies created by the merger
between 1 and 2, as compared with the other two possible mergers. Thus, the
merger between these two rms is not only the most protable but also is likely
to be the most e¢ cient (from the total surplus point of view). Assuming that
mergers f1; 3g and f2; 3g are symmetric allows a drastic reduction in the number
of cases that need to be considered with little loss of economic insights.
Depending on industry characteristics and the impact of mergers on costs, (i)
 may be higher of lower than 0, and (ii)  may be higher of lower than 2.
Thus, we can distinguish four di¤erent regions (See Figure 1). In Region 1 merg-
ers are protable with respect to the status quo ( > 0) and attractive; that is
rms prefer to be part of the merger rather than being left outside


2 > 


:
In Region 2 mergers are still protable but relatively unattractive; that is rms
prefer to stay out of the merger rather than being part of it


2 < 


. In
Region 3 mergers are unprotable with respect to the status quo ( < 0) but
they are attractive because, conditional on the occurrence of a merger, rms
prefer to be part of the merger rather standing alone

0 > 

2 > 


: Finally,
in Region 4 mergers are both unprotable and unattractive. In this case, it is
trivial that the only equilibrium involves no merger and hence we will ignore
it.1
The goal of our analysis is to predict which merger, if any, will arise, when,
and how rms will share the proceeds. For this purpose, we consider a non-
cooperative bargaining game that, we argue, is a natural and appropriate model
for these negotiations. We will relate this non-cooperative game and its out-
comes to a cooperative solution concept that we have developed in a separate
1See also Inderst and Wey (2004) and specially Fridol¤sson and Stennek (2005)
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paper.
2.2 The bargaining game
We propose a discrete time, innite horizon game. Players discount the future
using the same discount factor,  2 (0; 1). As long as no agreement has been
reached in the past, in any particular period the three rms play the following
sequential game, which consists of two stages: matching (selecting negotiation
partners) and actual negotiation between two players. More specically, this is
the timing of the perfect information game in any one period See Figure 2:
Matching
(1) Nature selects one of the three players, each with probability 13 . Let that
player be A.
(2) Player A invites one of the other two players to become her negotiation
partner. Let us call her player B.
(3) Player B accepts or rejects. If she accepts then players (A;B) enter into
the negotiation stage. If player B rejects then players (B;C) enter into the
negotiation stage.
Negotiation between F and E.
(4) Nature selects one of the two players, each with probability 12 . Let that
player be F .
(5) Player F makes an o¤er to player E: EF , understood as the per-period
prots that E keeps if merged with F .
(6) Player E accepts or rejects Fs o¤er. If E accepts then she gets EF
per period ( 
E
F
1  discounted total payo¤), player F gets 
D
FE   EF (
D
FE EF
1 
discounted total payo¤) and the game ends. If E rejects the o¤er then everyone
obtains 0 in that period and the game moves to the next period.
What is important about the structure of the matching game is that natures
choice in the matching stage does not impose upper or lower bounds on the
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probability of any given match in the period. This would not be the case if,
for instance, we assumed instead that in the third stage of the matching game
when player B rejects the o¤er then player A (and only her) can still ask player
C. In that case, a negotiation between players B and C would be impossible in
that period. We will comment more on alternative specications later.
We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) in stationary strategies.
Also, we are interested in situations where the bargaining friction is negligible.
Thus, we will pay particular attention to the limit of equilibria as  ! 1.
Let i; j; k represent generic, di¤erent players. A strategy for player i consists
of

ji ; 
j
i ; 
k
i

for the matching game and

ji ; 
j
i ; 
k
i ; 
k
i

for the negotiation
stage. ji is the probability that player i proposes player j to be her negotiation
partner in node (2), if i is chosen by nature in node (1). Given the denition of
the game, the probability that i proposes k is ki = 1  ji . ji is the probability
that player i accepts player js invitation to become a negotiation partner in
node (3), and ki is the probability that i accepts player ks invitation. In line
with the restriction to stationary strategies, we will assume that ji = 1 ki . We
will comment on the e¤ect of this assumption later. Thus, in case nature chooses
player i, then the probability that players (i; j) negotiate in nodes (5) and (6) is
ji
i
j , the probability that (i; k) negotiate is 
k
i 
i
k =

1  ji

ik, and the prob-
ability that (j; k) negotiate is ji
k
j + 
k
i 
j
k = 
j
i
 
1  ij

+

1  ji
  
1  ik

.
In the negotiation game, ji is the (per period) o¤er that player i makes
to player j with probability ji in node (5) if the former is chosen by nature
in node (4) as the proponent. ki and 
k
i are the corresponding values in a
negotiation with k. In order to avoid open-set technical problems, and also
to save in notation, we assume that in node (6) the respondent accepts with
probability one any o¤er above or equal to the value of continuation. That is
why we do not include these decisions in the denition of a strategy. As we will
see in the analysis below, this is innocuous and in particular does not rule out
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the possibility of delay in case of indi¤erence.2 Again, note that in line with the
restriction to stationary strategies, we are implicitly assuming that the answer
to invitations to negotiate in node (3) and the o¤er in node (5) does not depend
on who made the invitation to meet or who answered to that invitation, but
only on the identity of the partner. Again, we will comment on this assumption
later.
Let us denote by ui player is expected payo¤ per period in a particular
equilibrium. Thus, the total payo¤ is ui1  . The analysis of the negotiation
stage is straightforward, given these values. If ui + uj < ij then 
j
i = uj
and ji = 
i
j = 1. If ui + uj > ij then no acceptable o¤er is made with
positive probability in the negotiation between i and j. Finally, if ui + uj =
ij then 
j
i = uj and this is compatible with any 
j
i ; 
i
j 2 [0; 1]. Also, if
ui + uj < ij ; if player i is the proponent then she gets ij   uj and if she
is the respondent she gets ui. If ui + uj  ij then she gets ui. As a
result, player is expected payo¤ of reaching the negotiation stage with player j
is uiji = max

1
2 (ij   uj + ui) ; ui
	
.
For future reference it will be useful to note that in case ji = 
i
j = 1 the prob-
ability that i and j merge is given by pij = 13
h
ji
i
j + 
i
j
j
i + 
i
k
j
i +
 
1  ik

ij
i
:
3 Protable and attractive mergers (Region 1)
Consider the case in which all mergers increase the prots of all rms, and more
so the joint prots of the rms that are parties to it:  > 2 > 0. Let us
denote by 	 the extra prots enjoyed by the merging rms, 	    2 > 0.
In the region we are considering all incentives are favorable to the occurrence
of a merger. However, what is not so clear is the identity of the merger.
2 Indeed, apart from open-set issues, in a SPE there could be indi¤erence between accepting
and rejecting a partners o¤er only if the sum of the continuation values for both partners is
equal to what they have to share. In ths case, the fact that the proponent can choose any
value  in [0; 1] already allows for any probability of delay.
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The following proposition shows the unique equilibrium outcome, including the
probability of each merger, in Region 1.
Proposition 1 For  su¢ ciently large, there exists a unique SPE outcome,
both in payo¤s and probability distribution over mergers. A merger occurs with
probability 1 in the rst period (no delay). There exists a threshold (), with
lim !1 = 	1 2 , such that if   () then rms 1 and 2 merge with proba-
bility 1. If  < () then all three potential mergers take place with positive
probability.
Proof. See Appendix.
If mergers are su¢ ciently heterogeneous,   	1 2 , then the e¢ cient
merger is not challenged by the presence of alternative protable mergers. In-
deed, if such merger occurs with probability one, then in the limit the joint
prots per period for players 1 and 3 (and, similarly, players 2 and 3) are
1
2 (
 +) + (   ). Therefore, if what players 1 and 3 can obtain by
merging, , is less than this amount then there are no protable deviations.
As   ! 1, such a condition approaches precisely   	1 2 . The proposition
tells us that this is in fact the only equilibrium outcome.
The problem is much more interesting when  < 	1 2 . It is clear that
an equilibrium with p = 1 does not exist since rms can always have access to
protable deviations. An alternative way of putting it is that in this case the core
of the cooperative game is empty. That is, player 3 can always o¤er either player
1 or player 2 a share of the gains from merging that renders the deal mutually
benecial. Hence, when the core is empty then a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist. In the unique equilibrium all three players are indi¤erent with
respect to their merging partner and any of the three mergers can occur with
positive probability. In other words, the implementation of the e¢ cient merger
is disturbed by the presence of player 3, since players 1 and 2 are actually
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indi¤erent between implementing the e¢ cient merger or merging with player 3.
More specically, in equilibrium p13 = p23  q, and p12 + 2q = 1. In the
rest of the paper, and in order to simplify notation we use p  p12: If player
1 negotiates with 2, then she obtains 12 (
 +) per period; alternatively, if
player 1 negotiates with 3, then she obtains 12 (
 + u1   u3). Hence, player
1 is indi¤erent if and only if:
u1   u3 = : (1)
In equilibrium u1 and u3 are given by:
u1 = (1  q) 1
2
( +) + q; (2)
u3 = (1  2q) (   ) + 2q 1
2
( + u3   u1) : (3)
If we solve equations (1),(2), and (3) for q and take the limit  ! 1, then we
have:
q =
	  (1  2)
3	  (1  4) : (4)
Thus, q is a decreasing function of , and it takes the value q = 13 for  = 0
and the value 0 for  = 	1 2 . Consequently, p is an increasing function of 
and it takes the value 13 for  = 0 and the value 1 for  =
	
1 2 .
As discussed in the introduction, the existing literature has focused mostly
on symmetric market structures. It has pointed out two important phenomena:
the possibility that protable mergers might be delayed and the occurrence of
unprotable mergers, essentially in Regions 2 and 3. However, in the regions
where the ine¢ cient aggregate outcome may occur, there is always another
equilibrium in which the e¢ cient outcome takes place with probability one.
Thus, these two phenomena can be thought of as the result of some kind of
coordination failure: rms coordinate in the "wrong" equilibrium. If players
could coordinate their expectations then they would be willing to do so. In
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line with the rest of the literature, we have found that in Region 1 a merger
occurs immediately with probability one. However, we have found a di¤erent
sort of phenomenon related to the identity of the merging partners: a relatively
ine¢ cient merger takes place with positive probability. Even more importantly,
this equilibrium is unique. That is, it is not the result of any coordination failure,
but is simply a consequence of the relative strength of player 3 that makes the
possible occurrence of relatively ine¢ cient mergers unavoidable. Fixing this
type of bargaining failure would require more than coordinating expectations,
and would require a binding agreement with side payments among the three
players. That is, the formation of the grand coalition.
In addition to studying asymmetric mergers (which, of course, makes the
identity of the merging partners a relevant issue) we view our bargaining game
and some of its important properties as a methodological contribution. To
illustrate this point, we rst compare our game with some standard games that
have been used to study endogenous mergers. Then, we relate the predictions
of our non-cooperative game to a cooperative solution concept that we have
developed somewhere else.
In the spirit of Stähl and Rubinstein, Fridol¤son and Stennek (2005) propose
the following bargaining game. In the rst period, nature chooses as proponent
one of the three players, each with equal probability. The proponent makes
a specic o¤er to one of the other two players. The respondent accepts or
rejects. If she accepts the merger takes place and the game is over. If she
rejects then they move into the next period and the game starts again.3 Using
a notation similar to the one used above, let us denote by ji the probability
that i makes an o¤er to j, and by ij the probability that j accepts is o¤er. In
3 In fact, they frame their game in continuous time and bidding rounds occur at random
points in time.However, they also focus on the limit case that the expected di¤erence between
two bidding rounds goes to zero. This is equivalent to the deterministic version we discuss in
the text.
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an equilibrium where a merger occurs in the rst period with probability one,
then the probability of the e¢ cient merger is given by p = 13
 
21
1
2 + 
1
2
2
1

.
That is, p is bounded above by 23 . This bound has nothing to do with decisions
on the part of players, but it is an artifact (a rigidity) imposed by the design of
the game on the outcomes of negotiation. Due to this rigidity, player 3 "must"
be part of the merger in one out of three times unless there is delay, and as a
consequence, her payo¤ is higher than the payo¤ in our game. Moreover, also
as a consequence of this rigidity, in a subset of Region 1 the game studied by
Fridol¤son and Stennek (2005) has multiple equilibria in the asymmetric case.
(Details are available upon request.) In particular, if player 1 expects that player
2 will accept player 30s o¤er, then u1 will be relatively low and player 1 will also
accept player 3s o¤er (the symmetric is true for player 2). However, if player 1
expects that player 2 will reject player 30s o¤er, then u1 will be relatively higher,
which will induce her to reject also player 3s o¤er and will generate some delay.
Clearly, u1 and u2 are higher in the second equilibrium.
In contrast, in our game if a merger occurs immediately with probability one,
then p = 13

21
1
2 + 
1
2
2
1 +
1
2
 
21 + 
1
2

. That is, p can take any value between
0 and 1, and whether this happens or not will depend on the decisions of players.
In other words, as discussed in the introduction our bargaining game is exible
in the sense that nature does not impose any restriction on the likelihood of
any match. This has as one of its consequences sharper predictions in Region 1
(unique equilibrium).
Our non-cooperative game in Region 1 implements the PSBN (Prediction
for Simultaneous Bilateral Negotiations). In Burguet and Caminal (2010) we
dene PSBN as the generalization of Nash Bargaining Solution to simultaneous
bargaining negotiations. The underlying assumption is that all pairs simultane-
ously bargain à la Nash, and in each of these negotiations fallback options are
endogenous and determined by (consistent) expectations on the consequences
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of failing to reach an agreement in that particular negotiation. Players are as-
sumed to share the same beliefs on the probability distribution over the success
of di¤erent coalitions. In our restricted model this is equivalent to sharing be-
liefs on (p; q) such that p+2q = 1. Therefore, if negotiations between players 1
and 3 break down then they will expect that coalition (1; 2) will succeed with
(conditional) probability p1 q , and coalition (1; 3) with probability
q
1 q . Other
than that, the PSBN only imposes a weak restriction on the set of admissible
beliefs: a coalition cannot have positive probability of success if both players
prefer to reach an agreement with the third player, with one of the preferences
being strict.
4 Protable but unattractive mergers (Region
2)
Consider the case in which a merger benets all rms, including the one that
is left standing alone, but in fact the latter benets more on average: 2 >
 > 0. That is, 	 < 0. In this case, rms may engage in a war of attrition,
and as in any such situation, even though forming a merger is protable this
may be delayed by the even greater gain of been left out of the merger if one
occurs. See again Inderst and Wey (2004) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005).
It is also well known that in this region (as well as in Region 3) there are
very strong reasons for the existence of multiple equilibria, and our game will
not be an exception. Thus, for simplicity, we restrict ourselves to equilibria
where strategies are partially symmetric. More specically 21 = 
1
2; 
2
1 = 
1
2;
13 = 
1
3 =
1
2 . As a result p13 = p23 = q, and u1 = u2:
Like in Region 1, in the limit as   ! 1 an equilibrium with p = 1 exists if
and only if 	  (1  2). Moreover, since 	 < 0 this condition is satised
for all   0.
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The polar case, that is, an equilibrium with q = 12 exists if and only if player
1 (player 2) prefers negotiating with player 3 to negotiating with player 2 (player
1):
   u3   +  u1: (5)
But now eu1 and eu3 are given respectively by:
u1 =
1
2

1
2
(   u3 + u1) + 

; (6)
u3 =
1
2
(   u1 + u3) : (7)
If we solve equations (6) and (7) for the limiting case of  = 1 and we plug
the solution in equation (5) then we get that an equilibrium with q = 12 exists
if and only if    	. That is, provided that players 1 and 2 are worse o¤
than player 3 if they merge, then there is an equilibrium where one of the two
ine¢ cient mergers occurs in the rst period with probability one.
It turns out that an equilibrium where a merger occurs with probability one
in the rst period but p > 0 and q > 0 does not generically exist in this region.
Indeed, when we solve the system of equations (1) to (3) in this region, we
obtain u1 > 12 (
 +) and therefore players 1 and 2 should not be willing to
merge. The intuition is relatively simple. If all meetings lead to mergers with
probability 1, then refusing to merge will lead with positive probability to be
left out of the merger, and with the complement probability it will lead to be
part of a meeting again in the next period.4 For  close to 1, some rm should
nd such deviation protable unless all of them make at least (almost)  by
merging, which is impossible in this region.
There exists a third type of equilibrium, as in any war of attrition, where
the probability of a merger in any given period is positive but lower than one.
4Moreover, if all mergers have positive probability that implies that all rms are indi¤erent
as to which of the other two rms it merges, just as in the similar equilibrium in Region 1.
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More specically, suppose that in any negotiation players are indi¤erent between
reaching an agreement or moving to the next period. In this case:
( +)  u1 = u1; (8)
   u1 = u3: (9)
Also u1 and u3 are given respectively by:
u1 = p
1
2
( +) + qu1 + q + (1  p  2q) u1; (10)
u3 = p (
   ) + 2qu3 + (1  p  2q) u3: (11)
Clearly, as  goes to 1, p and q go to zero. In other words, as rounds are
closer in time, the probability that a merger materializes in any one round goes
to zero. In order to study the expected delay as   ! 1, we can solve the
system of equations (8) to (11) ; for p1  and
q
1  and study the behavior of
those solutions as   ! 1. Solving that system we get
p
1   =
  
	+ (1  2) ; (12)
q
1   =
 +
	  : (13)
An equilibrium in mixed strategies exists if and only if p; q 2 [0; 1], and p1  +
2 q1   1. These conditions are satised if and only if   min f 	; g.
Note that p is decreasing in  while q is increasing in . Also, note that delay
is decreasing in : as  increases (p+ 2q) increases.
In the Appendix we also show that no other type of equilibrium with partially
symmetric strategies exists. All this information can be summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the limit as  goes to 1 and: (i) if   min f 	; g
then there are three equilibrium outcomes: (a) p = 1, (b) q = 12 , (c) p; q > 0,
p+2q < 1; (ii) if  2 [min f 	; g ; 	] there are two equilibrium outcomes:
(a) p = 1, (b) q = 12 ; if  >  	 then there is a unique equilibrium with p = 1.
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Provided that rms 1 and 2 are worse o¤ than rm 3 if they merge, then the
multiplicity of equilibria prevails in spite of the asymmetry. Moreover, in two
of these equilibria a relatively ine¢ cient merger may occur. Thus, in addition
to the aggregate problem (a protable merger is delayed), the identity of the
merger may not be the most desirable.
5 Unprotable but relatively attractive mergers
(Region 3)
Suppose that mergers are not protable, but staying out of a merger is even
more damaging; i.e., 0 >  > 2. The literature has pointed out the possible
occurrence of preemptive mergers in such case.
Let us rst consider equilibria with p = q = 0. In this case, u1 = u3 = 0.
Players 1 and 2 will nd it protable to deviate if and only if their merger is
protable. Thus, this is an equilibrium provided that    .
Also, p = 1 will be an equilibrium outcome if +  2u1 =  ( +).
Hence, as   ! 1 this is equivalent to    . Thus, these two types of
equilibria are mutually exclusive and e¢ cient.
Like in Region 1 there is also an equilibrium where a merger takes place
immediately with probability one: p = 1   2q and p; q > 0. In this case q is
given by equation (4). Thus, an equilibrium of this type exists if and only if
  	1 2 .
Finally, by looking at equation (12) it is immediate that an equilibrium with
p < 1   2q and p; q > 0 does not exist since in this region this would involve
p < 0.
In the Appendix we also show that no other type of equilibrium with partially
symmetric strategies exists. We summarize this discussion for the case 	1 2 >
 :
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Proposition 3 If 	1 2 >  , in the limit as  goes to 1: (i) if    ;
then there are two equilibrium outcomes: (a) p = q = 0, (b) p; q > 0; p+2q = 1;
(ii) if  2
h
 ; 	1 2
i
; then there are two equilibrium: (b) p; q > 0, p+2q = 1,
and (c) p = 1, (iii) if  > 	1 2 then there is a unique equilibrium with p = 1.
If 	1 2 <  ;in the limit as  goes to 1: (i) if   	1 2 ; then there are
two equilibrium outcomes: (a) p = q = 0, (b) p; q > 0; p + 2q = 1; (ii) if
 2
h
	
1 2 ; 
i
; then there is a unique equilibrium outcome with p = q = 0,
(iii) if  >   then there is a unique equilibrium with p = 1
Like in Region 2 in addition to the aggregate ine¢ ciency (non protable
mergers may take place) there is an issue with the identity of the merger. Unless
heterogeneity is su¢ ciently large, there is an equilibrium where a relatively
ine¢ cient merger may occur with positive probability.
6 Discussion (to be completed)
Bargaining failure in Region 1 is of a di¤erent nature than in the other two
regions. In the former case there is a unique equilibrium in which there is a
positive probability that the relatively ine¢ cient merger occurs, while in the
other two regions there is a coordination failure: whenever there is an equi-
librium where a protable (with respect to the status quo) merger is delayed
or an unprotable merger that takes place, then there is also another equilib-
rium where merger decisions are taken according to their protability. However,
in all these cases (including the ine¢ ciency found in Region 1) the underlying
problem is that the three rms cannot reach a binding agreement. This may
have important policy implications. Suppose merger control is imperfect (makes
type one and type two mistakes) and social and private incentives to merge are
not always aligned. Consider two scenarios. In the rst one, the three rms
cannot get together and merger proposals arise as equilibrium outcomes of our
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game. In the second one, a merger is submitted only if it maximizes industry
prots (rms 1 and 2 are able to make a payment to rm 3). Then, there is an
interesting trade-o¤. If binding agreements among the three rms are allowed
then, on the one hand, no merger proposal which is worse than another one is
submitted; but, on the other hand, some socially ine¢ cient but protable merg-
ers are immediately submitted (delay is eliminated) and, moreover, e¢ cient but
unprotable mergers will no longer be submitted.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As a preliminary stage we derive the following properties of any SPE.
8.1.1 Property 1: At least in one negotiation there is a strictly posi-
tive surplus; i.e., there exist a pair (i; j) such that ij > ui+uj :
Suppose not; i.e., for all (i; j) ij  ui+uj . Then, ui = pjkDi +(1  pjk) u1:
Hence, ui  max

0; Di
	
: Similarly, uj  max

0; Dj
	
. Therefore, ui+ uj 
max

0; Di ; 
D
j ; 
D
i + 
D
j
	
< Dij : We have reached a contradiction.
8.1.2 Property 2: It cannot be the case that in two and only two
negotiations there is a strictly positive surplus.
Suppose that in two and only two negotiations there is a strictly positive surplus,
i.e.,
ui + uj  Dij
ui + uk < 
D
ik
uj + uk < 
D
jk
These inequalities imply that:
uk <
Dik + 
D
jk   Dij
2
(14)
Since uiki > ui = u
ij
i then 
k
i = 1: Similarly, 
k
j = 1: As a result, pij = 0
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and pik + pjk = 1: Hence, we can write:
ui = pik
1
2
 
Dik + ui   uk

+ (1  pik)Di
uj = pik
D
j + (1  pik)
1
2
 
Djk + uj   uk

uk = pik
1
2
 
Dik + uk   ui

+ (1  pik) 1
2
 
Djk + uk   uj

If we solve the system for uk then it turns out that for any pik 2 [0; 1] ; the
solution violates inequality (14) : We have reached a contradiction.
8.1.3 Property 3: If player i strictly prefers to meet player j and
viceversa, then i = 1 and j = 2:
Consider rst the case where there is only one negotiation with a strictly positive
surplus. Then it has to be the negotiation between players i and j: That is, we
have that uiji > u
ik
i  ui, and uijj > ujkj  uj . Therefore, Dij = uiji + uijj >
ui+ uj : Suppose that either palyer i or player j is player 3 (the reader should
remember that players 1 and 2 are symmetric) i.e.,
u1 + u2   +
u1 + u3 < 

u2 + u3  
From these inequalities we obtain that u2 > 12 (
 +) : But since player
2 is not able to reach an agreement, we have that u2 = p13 + (1  p13) u2;
which implies that u2 =
p13

1 +p13  max f0; g < 12 ( +). We have
reached a contradiction.
Alternatively, if all three negotiation involve a strictly positive surplus, then
suppose that:
u131 > u
12
1
u133 > u
23
3
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These inequalities imply that:
u2   u3 > 

u1 < u2
In case u122 > u
23
2 then 
1
2 = 
2
1 = 1 and hence p23 = 0 and p12 + p13 = 1
(since all negotiations end up in agreement): Then, we can write:
u1 = p12u
12
1 + p13u
13
1  u121 (15)
The last inequality holds because u121 > u
13
1 : Similarly,
u2 = p12u
12
2 + p13
  u122 (16)
The last inequality holds because u1 < u2 implies that u122 >
+
2 > 
:
But (15) and (16) together contradict that u1 < u2.
In case u122 < u
23
2 then p12 = 0 and p13 + p23 = 1: Then, we can write:
u2 = p13
 + p23u232  u233 (17)
The last inequality holds because u2 > u3 implies that u232 >

2 > 
:
Similarly,
u3 = p13u
13
3 + p23u
23
3  u233 (18)
The last inequality holds because u122 < u
23
2 . But (17) and (18) together
contradict that u3 < u2.
Finally, in case u122 = u
23
2 and if p12 = 0; then we are back to the previous
case; but p12 > 0 if and only if either u131  12u121 +
 
1  12

 (that is, player 1
sets 21 > 0), which implies that 
 > u131 , or u
13
3  12 (   )+
 
1  12

u233
(that is player 3 sets 23 > 0), which implies that 
    > u133 : Suppose that
 > u131 then:
u1 = p12u
12
1 + p13u
13
1 + p23
  u121
u2 = (p12 + p23)u
12
2 + p13
  u122
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and hence we reach a contradition. If     > u133 then:
u2 = (p12 + p23)u
23
2 + p13
  u232
u3 = p12 (
   ) + p13u133 + p23u233  u233
and again we reach a contradiction.
8.1.4 Property 4: Preference cycles cannot occur: If i weakly prefers
to meet with j, j weakly prefers to meet with k; and k weakly
prefers to meet with i, then they all must be indi¤erent.
Suppose not. If all three negotiations end up in agreement, ui + uj  ij , for
all i; j; then
ij   uj  ik   uk (19)
jk   uk  ij   ui (20)
ik   ui  jk   uj (21)
If we add up these three inequalities then this can only be satised if the
three hold with equality.
Suppose instead that only players i and j are willing to reach an agreement.
In this case, the system becomes:
ij   uj  ui (22)
uj  ij   ui (23)
uk  uk (24)
If we add up equations (22) to (24) then again this can only be satised if
the three hold with equality.
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8.1.5 Property 5: If player 1 strictly prefers to meet player 2, and
viceversa, then p12 = 1.
If u121 > u
13
1 then 
2
1 = 1: Similarly, if u
12
2 > u
23
2 then 
1
2 = 1: Since u
13
1  u1
and u232  u2, then + = u121 +u122 > u1+ u2: That is, 21 = 12 = 1 and
p12 =
1
3
 
21 + 
1
2 + 1

> 0:
Suppose that u1 = u2. In this case, u121 = u
12
2 =
+
2 > 
: Thus, if player
1 sets 21 = 1 then se obtains u
12
1 , which is higher than anything she might obtain
in case 21 = 0; namely, u
13
1 ; u1; 
 (or a combination of these three elements).
Hence, player 1 nds it optimal to set 21 = 1: Similarly, 
1
2 = 1, and hence
p12 = 1:
Suppose now (without loss of generality) that u1 > u2: In this case, u121 >
+
2 > 
: Hence, player 1 clearly nds it optimal to set 21 = 1. The
argument for player 2 is a bit more complicated. Suppose that the negotiation
between 1 and 2 is the only one that generates a strictly positive surplus. In
this case, if player 2 sets 12 = 1 then she obtains u
12
1 , and if she sets 
1
2 = 0,
then she obtains u2: But note that u2 = u232 < u
12
2 , and hence she chooses
12 = 1. Because of Property 2 the only alternative is that all three negotiations
generate a strictly positive surplus. In this case u233 =
1
2 (
 + u3   u2)
> 12 (
 + u3   u1) = u133 ; and hence 22 = 1: Hence, if player 2 sets 12 = 0
then she obtains u232 : Hence, in this case player 2 also nds it optimal to set
12 = 1. Therefore, p12 = 1:
8.1.6 Property 6: Players 1 and 2 obtain the same expected payo¤
Without loss of generality suppose u1 > u2: First, suppose that the negotiation
between 1 and 2 is the only one that generates a strictly positive surplus: In
this case, u121 > u1 = u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u2 = u
23
2 , and from Property 5; p12 = 1,
which implies that u1 = u2 = 12 (
 +) : Contradiction.
Suppose now that all three negotiations generate a strictly positive surplus:
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In this case player 3 strictly prefers to meet player 2 rather than player 1:
u233 > u
13
3 : Then from Property 4 there are two possibilities; (a) u
23
2 > u
12
2 , and
(b) u121 > u
13
1 and u
23
2  u122 . Case (a) is ruled out by Property 3. In case (b)
Note that u121 > u
13
1 implies that 
2
1 = 1; and u
23
3 > u
13
3 implies that 
2
3 = 1:
Hence, p13 = 0 and p12 + p23 = 1: Thus,
u1 = p12u
12
1 + p23
  u121 (25)
u2 = p12u
12
2 + p23u
23
3 (26)
If u232 < u
12
2 then from Property 5; p12 = 1; and equations (25) and (26)
imply that u1 = u2: If u232 = u
12
2 then u2 = u
12
2 ; which together with inequality
(25) contradicts that u1 > u2:
8.1.7 Property 7: There are two possible types of equilibria: (I)
u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u
23
2 , (II) u
ij
i = u
ik
i for all i; j; k:
Since u1 = u2 (Property 6) then u233 = u
13
3 . Thus, both u
12
2  u232 , u121  u131 ,
and u122  u232 , u121  u131 would violate Property 4, unless both inequalities hold
with equality. Thus, besides the case where all players are indi¤erent, there are
two other cases to consider: (a) u122 < u
23
2 , u
12
1 < u
13
1 and (b) u
12
2 > u
23
2 , u
12
1 >
u131 : Case (a) cannot be part of an equilibrium, since in this case 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 0
and hence p12 = 0: Moreover, 13 > u1+ u3; and 23 > u2+ u3. Therefore,
p13 + p23 = 1: In this case:
u1 = p13
1
2
(   u3 + u1) + p23
u2 = p13
 + p23
1
2
(   u3 + u2)
u3 =
1
2
(   u1 + u3)
Since u1 = u2 then p13 = p23: If we solve the above system we get that
u3 =
(2 ) 
4 3 >

2 : As a result u
13
1 <

2 <
+
2 = u
12
1 We have
reached a contradiction.
We can now proceede to characterize the two types of equilibria.
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8.1.8 Equilbrium type I
Consider and equilibrium with u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u
23
2 . From Property 4;
p12 = 1: Hence:
u1 = u2 =
1
2
( +)
u3 = 
   
Thus, a protable deviation for either player 1 or player 2 exists whenever
1
2 (
 +) < 12

    12 ( +) +  (   )

:Therefore, p12 = 1 is an
equilibrium if and only if:
  	
2     2  () < 	
8.1.9 Equilibrium type II
Consider and equilibrium with uiji = u
ik
i for all i; j; k: In this case:
 +  u3 =    u1 (27)
and
u1 = (p12 + p13)
1
2
( +) + p23
u2 = (p12 + p23)
1
2
( +) + p13
u3 = p12 (
   ) + (p13 + p23) 1
2
(  )
Since u1 = u2 then p13 = p23  q: Also note that if   	1 2 then u1 
1
2 (
 +) and u3  12 (  ). Hence, u1 + u2 < 12 ( +) and u1 +
u3 <
1
2
. Therefore, any of the three negotiation will end up in agreement:
p12 = 1  2q: If we plug u1 and u3 into equation (??) and solve for q :
q =
	    2   1  2
3	 (1  2)
Note that q  0 if and only if   	2
 1 2
 : Finally, if  > 	1 2 then
for  su¢ ciently close to 1 then u1 + u3 > 12
 and players 1 and 2 cannot
be indi¤erent between negotiating between them or with player 3:
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Summarizing, for any  su¢ ciently close to 1 the equilibrium exists and is
unique.
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π∗
2
**π
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
N
Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
1/3
1/3
1/3
2
1μ
3
1μ
Firm 2
Firm 3
1
2λ
3
2λ
1
3λ
2
3λ
Firms 1 & 2 negotiate
Firms 2 & 3 negotiate
Firms 1 & 3 negotiate
Firms 2 & 3 negotiate
